A SIPRI background paper maps how quantum computing, communications and sensing are moving from the lab into defence ministries worldwide — and warns that arms control frameworks are dangerously behind the technology’s pace.
Quantum technology is no longer a distant scientific curiosity — it is becoming a strategic asset that governments cannot afford to ignore. The SIPRI Background Paper “An Introduction to Military Quantum Technology for Policymakers” published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), authored by quantum security researcher Michal Krelina, argues that a “second quantum revolution” is reshaping military planning from Washington to Beijing, while regulatory oversight struggles to keep up.
Unlike the first quantum revolution, which produced lasers, semiconductors and nuclear technology by harnessing the collective behaviour of particles, the current wave focuses on controlling individual electrons and photons. This shift unlocks three overlapping fields with clear defence relevance: quantum computing, quantum communications and quantum sensing.
Quantum computers promise to solve optimisation and material-simulation problems beyond the reach of classical machines, but the same power threatens to one day break widely used encryption. Quantum communications, led by quantum key distribution, offers theoretically unhackable data links; researchers demonstrated a drone-based version in 2024. Quantum sensing may prove the most immediately useful: navigation systems that work without GPS, gravimeters capable of detecting submarines, and imaging that peers through obstacles or around corners are already moving from prototype to field trial.
Governments are responding with substantial funding. The paper points to the US National Quantum Initiative, China’s state-backed research programmes, the European Union’s Quantum Flagship and its defence-oriented EuroQCI network, and national efforts in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and India. Military research bodies including DARPA, NATO’s DIANA innovation accelerator and India’s DRDO are channelling funds into dual-use projects, reflecting how commercial quantum start-ups increasingly depend on government and defence money to survive.
The paper highlights the United States and China as the central rivalry, each racing to avoid falling behind the other in a field where progress is difficult to verify due to secrecy around military R&D. Washington has imposed export controls on quantum computing hardware and restricted US investment in Chinese quantum firms; Beijing has tightened its own research controls in response. Elsewhere, the paper flags starker imbalances — notably between India and Pakistan — where a widening quantum gap could unsettle the nuclear deterrence posture of two nuclear-armed neighbours, for instance through improved submarine-tracking sensors.
Cooperation is advancing alongside rivalry. The AUKUS partnership between Australia, the UK and the US has made quantum technology a shared priority, while China and Russia have jointly tested a quantum communications link they describe as tailored for BRICS partners.
Perhaps the paper’s sharpest warning concerns governance. Existing arms control instruments, including the Wassenaar Arrangement’s export-control lists, only partially capture quantum-related technologies, and Russia has blocked efforts to expand them. Meanwhile, treaties such as the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions have yet to grapple with how quantum-enhanced molecular simulation could accelerate the design of new chemical or biological threats — even as the same sensing technology could eventually strengthen verification of nuclear test bans.
Commercial dynamics add another layer of urgency. Companies such as Google, IBM, Amazon, Alibaba and Atos are pouring resources into quantum computing, while a wave of smaller start-ups pursue niche sensing and communications applications. Venture capital for these firms remains modest compared with the sums flowing into artificial intelligence, leaving many quantum companies reliant on government grants and defence contracts to stay afloat — a dependency that further blurs the line between civilian research and military application, and one that gives defence ministries outsized influence over which technologies reach maturity first.
The paper also cautions against tunnel vision on encryption. Much of the public debate about quantum risk centres on the moment a sufficiently powerful quantum computer could break current cryptographic standards. Krelina argues the more immediate and under-studied risks lie elsewhere: high-precision quantum sensors falling into the hands of non-state actors or rogue states, quantum-assisted simulation accelerating the design of stealth coatings or novel armour, and the sheer difficulty of writing arms control language for a technology whose military value is still being discovered. He suggests that a scientific advisory body modelled on the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons could help treaty negotiators keep pace.
Krelina’s conclusion is blunt: today’s quantum systems remain error-prone and limited, but history shows that breakthroughs can arrive faster than expected. He calls for policymakers to move now — investing in quantum-safe cryptography, monitoring the technology’s trajectory and building oversight frameworks — rather than waiting for a moment when the security landscape has already shifted irreversibly.
Dr. Jakob Jung is Editor-in-Chief of Security Storage and Channel Germany. He has been working in IT journalism for more than 20 years. His career includes Computer Reseller News, Heise Resale, Informationweek, Techtarget (storage and data center) and ChannelBiz. He also freelances for numerous IT publications, including Computerwoche, Channelpartner, IT-Business, Storage-Insider and ZDnet. His main topics are channel, storage, security, data center, ERP and CRM.
Contact via Mail: jakob.jung@security-storage-und-channel-germany.de
The speed of hardware development often creates a gap between policy and implementation.