A CVSS 10.0 vulnerability in the SAP Gateway allows unauthenticated remote code execution. According to Onapsis, patching alone is not enough: the proxy configuration decides whether systems are exposed.

SAP has closed a maximum-severity hole in the SAP Gateway with its November Security Patch Day. The flaw, dubbed PROXYGATE (CVE-2026-89103), allows an unauthenticated attacker with network access to execute operating system commands on an SAP system. As its discoverers at Onapsis stress, a version check alone does not reveal whether a system is at risk.

The vulnerability was found and reported by the Onapsis Research Labs (ORL) and is addressed in SAP Security Note 3798345, accompanied by FAQ Note 3810197. The note carries a CVSS score of 10.0, the highest possible rating. According to Onapsis, an attacker needs neither credentials nor user interaction to run commands as the <sid>adm user, the account that owns the SAP installation. In practice, that means complete control of the system.

The SAP Gateway is the component through which other systems make RFC calls, where external RFC servers register and which can start helper programs on the host. It runs by default on every SAP NetWeaver ABAP application server. A component with that much reach relies on access control lists to decide on whose behalf it acts, which is why a flaw that bends those decisions carries such weight.

What makes PROXYGATE unusual is where it strikes. Most hardening guidance for the SAP Gateway focuses on the access control lists secinfo and reginfo. PROXYGATE, however, turns on a third list, prxyinfo, which governs which connections the gateway may relay on behalf of a client. Onapsis explains that a specially crafted series of requests in the gateway’s CPI-C layer can make the gateway believe an external request comes from an internal application server. Once it does, the configured rules approve it. Technical exploitation details are deliberately withheld under responsible-disclosure practices.

Because the flaw sits in the SAP kernel, the scope is broad. It affects ABAP-based systems such as S/4HANA, ERP/ECC, BW and Solution Manager, but also AS Java, dual-stack and standalone gateway installations. Kernels that are out of maintenance, including 7.20, 7.21, 7.40, 7.41, 7.42, 7.45, 7.49, 7.73, 7.81, 7.85 and 7.89, are affected as well and must be upgraded to a supported, downward-compatible kernel.

Whether a system is exploitable is therefore a question of configuration. A permissive prxyinfo file, for example one with wildcard rules, leaves a system vulnerable regardless of its patch level. If no prxyinfo exists, the profile parameter gw/acl_mode_proxy decides; for backward compatibility it ships disabled, which allows all proxy connections. SAP’s fix combines a kernel patch with setting this parameter to 1. Kernels 7.93 and 9.16 already support it, while kernels 7.22, 7.53, 7.54, 7.77 and 8.04 gain it through the patch. The minimum kernel patch levels are 1612 for 7.22, 1625 for 7.53, 718 for 7.54, 915 for 7.77, 244 for 8.04, 16 for 9.20 and 4 for 9.21; any higher level contains the fix, and SAP lists no manual activity beyond the patch for kernels 9.20 and 9.21. Even a restrictive prxyinfo file does not make the patch optional, since the gateway falls back to its default proxy policy if the file is ever removed. Neither the patch alone nor hardened secinfo and reginfo files take a system out of scope.

The potential damage is considerable. With <sid>adm rights, attackers could extract database credentials and other secrets, collect RFC destinations to move laterally into connected SAP and non-SAP systems, establish persistent access, or halt systems and destroy data. For ERP landscapes, this means exposure of financial, HR, supply chain and customer data, along with reporting obligations under regulations such as SOX, NIS2 and GDPR.

As of publication on 10 November 2026 (updated on 12 November), Onapsis says it has not observed active exploitation in the wild and will update its advisory should that change. The company credits SAP’s Product Security Response Team with a swift fix within the coordinated-disclosure process.

Onapsis recommends a prioritized approach. First, inventory all systems running an SAP Gateway, including standalone, non-production and legacy systems, and record each system’s prxyinfo state, parameter value, kernel level and network reachability. Second, restrict permissive proxy policies immediately, starting with internet-reachable gateways. Third, set gw/acl_mode_proxy = 1 where supported, or create a restrictive prxyinfo as an interim control. Fourth, apply the kernel patches on every application server, not just the primary instance. Finally, limit access to the gateway ports 33NN and 48NN to hosts that genuinely need RFC access. SAP lists no official workaround for unpatched systems.

Onapsis also points to its own products: according to the company, its Defend platform has monitored for PROXYGATE since before the patch release, and Assess received new checks to identify exposed systems. These are vendor claims; administrators without such tools can work through the manual checks described above.

Customers and service providers running SAP landscapes should therefore treat the advisory as a configuration audit as much as a patch cycle, and not wait for signs of exploitation.

By Jakob Jung

Dr. Jakob Jung is Editor-in-Chief of Security Storage and Channel Germany. He has been working in IT journalism for more than 20 years. His career includes Computer Reseller News, Heise Resale, Informationweek, Techtarget (storage and data center) and ChannelBiz. He also freelances for numerous IT publications, including Computerwoche, Channelpartner, IT-Business, Storage-Insider and ZDnet. His main topics are channel, storage, security, data center, ERP and CRM.

Contact via Mail: jakob.jung@security-storage-und-channel-germany.de

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