A memory corruption bug in how the SAP kernel handles WebSocket traffic scores a CVSS 10.0. Onapsis researchers found it and SAP has patched it, so Basis teams now need to move fast.

SAP customers are facing a maximum-severity vulnerability. ICM2SHELL, tracked as CVE-2026-76964 and CVE-2026-89126, allows attackers with nothing more than network access to an HTTP or HTTPS port to run operating system commands on affected systems or simply crash them at will. Both flaws carry the top CVSS score of 10.0.

The vulnerability was discovered and reported by the Onapsis Research Labs (ORL). SAP closed it on its November Security Patch Day with Security Notes 3778530 (ICM) and 3778556 (SAP Web Dispatcher, including the instance embedded in SAP HANA XS), accompanied by FAQ Note 3778788. Onapsis credits SAP’s Product Security Response Team for a swift response within the coordinated-disclosure process.

A flaw in WebSocket handling

At its core, ICM2SHELL is a memory corruption bug in the way the SAP kernel processes WebSocket traffic. Large WebSocket messages are split into fragments that the receiver reassembles, and it is exactly this step that fails. A specially crafted sequence of messages makes the Internet Communication Manager (ICM) or the Web Dispatcher write attacker-controlled data beyond the memory reserved for the connection. Depending on how that data is shaped, the process either crashes or its memory is corrupted in a controlled way, which can be turned into arbitrary commands running as <sid>adm. According to Onapsis, ORL handed SAP a working exploit for unauthenticated remote code execution. The crash scenario reproduced on every kernel release tested.

What makes the finding so uncomfortable is how little an attacker needs. WebSocket support is enabled by default in both components, whether or not any application uses it. Some services, including default ICF services in SAP S/4HANA, accept WebSocket connections without authentication. No credentials, no user interaction and no misconfiguration are required. The Web Dispatcher is a particular concern: it reassembles the messages with the same vulnerable code. The reverse proxy meant to shield the landscape from the Internet thus becomes the first component exposed to it.

The stakes are high because <sid>adm owns the SAP installation, including executables, instance profiles, the secure store and the database connection. An attacker could harvest database credentials and RFC destinations, move laterally to connected systems, plant persistent access or destroy data. For ERP systems, that means exposure of financial, HR, supply chain and customer data, plus possible reporting duties under regimes such as SOX, NIS2 or GDPR. Even without code execution, a single connection can knock out the ICM or Web Dispatcher repeatedly. If it is a Web Dispatcher, every system behind it goes offline.

Who is affected

Exposure depends on the kernel, not the application release. All SAP NetWeaver AS ABAP systems on kernel 7.40 or higher are affected, as is every Web Dispatcher. AS Java is not, but dual-stack installations are because of their ABAP stack. Fixed patch levels include 7.53 PL 1616/1617, 7.54 PL 710, 7.77 PL 914, 7.93 PL 401/420, 9.16 PL 111, 9.18 PL 37 and 9.20 PL 11/13. Caution is warranted for 7.93: a higher level does not automatically mean a fixed one, as PL 419 is still vulnerable. Kernels out of maintenance, such as 7.40, 7.45 or 7.49, are affected and may not receive a fix, so they need an upgrade. Kernel 7.22 is not affected.

What to do now

Applying the two Security Notes is the only complete fix. Onapsis advises starting with Internet-facing Web Dispatchers and ICMs, then moving on to production systems. Every application server and every Web Dispatcher needs the new kernel, including embedded instances in SAP HANA XS and non-production copies holding production data.

Where patching is not immediately possible, SAP describes two temporary workarounds in Note 3778788. A Web Dispatcher on a higher patch level (for example 7.53 PL 1629, 7.54 PL 723, 7.93 PL 430 or 9.16 PL 200) can shield backends reached exclusively through it, though not if PROT=ROUTER is configured. Alternatively, setting icm/HTTP/support_websocket_upgrade=FALSE removes the flaw, but may break interactive and integration scenarios. Requests with status code 101 in the HTTP log show whether WebSocket is in use. Restricting network access to the HTTP/HTTPS ports and watching dev_icm and dev_webdisp for unexpected restarts adds a further layer of defense.

As of publication, ORL has not observed active exploitation in the wild, and Onapsis deliberately withholds technical details. The company says its Defend product has monitored for ICM2SHELL since before the patch, while Assess now offers checks to identify exposed systems. Those are vendor claims, but the advice stands regardless of vendor. With ICM2SHELL one of several critical findings in a record-setting patch day, Basis and security teams should tackle the Web Dispatcher first, and fast.

By Jakob Jung

Dr. Jakob Jung is Editor-in-Chief of Security Storage and Channel Germany. He has been working in IT journalism for more than 20 years. His career includes Computer Reseller News, Heise Resale, Informationweek, Techtarget (storage and data center) and ChannelBiz. He also freelances for numerous IT publications, including Computerwoche, Channelpartner, IT-Business, Storage-Insider and ZDnet. His main topics are channel, storage, security, data center, ERP and CRM.

Contact via Mail: jakob.jung@security-storage-und-channel-germany.de

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